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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines US government involvement in nutrition and agriculture.  Specifically, it attempts to explain the 
existence of conflicting information presented by scientific versus government so urces in the food pyramid. We 
start by examining the theory of the politicization of science and regulatory capture.  We then examine federal 
nutrition advice through this theoretical framework.  The paper concludes that the negative consequences of federal 
intervention for everyday Americans call for an alternative approach of decentralization, with an emphasis on 
private regulators, with government sticking to its core functions, rather than engaging in politicized favoritism.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the US Department of Agriculture started giving food advice in 1943, both the official guidance and 
the underlying science have evolved significantly. But there are often conflicts between the two. Indeed, 
there exists an honest disagreement over the science, as indicated by various non-government food 
pyramids (see section II.2 below). But the formal adoption process of the government pyramid indicates 
that government advice is more deeply influenced by industry lobbying and political jockeying, rather 
than science and the public interest.  
While individuals remain responsible for their own choices, information and availability of healthy foods 
do play a critical role in the decisions of individuals.  Alas, the nutritional guidance from the federal 
government has changed so much over the years, that it has lost credibility (for a history, see Archer et 
al. 2007; for a critique, see Scheall et al. forthcoming). Taubes (2007), for example, describes the shift, 
based on dodgy science, over the decades, from blaming carbohydrates for obesity and heart disease… to 
blaming fat… and back to blaming carbohydrates.  In that same period of time, "the incidence of obesity 
among adults over the age of 20 has more than double, from 13.4 to 35.7 percent.  The figures for 
younger Americans are little better…  These changes corresponded with a decrease in the percentage of 
fat… in the American diet, and an uptick in the consumption of carbohydrates" (ibid, 232-233).  
The shaky science foundations are matched by other political contradictions:  "US public policy 
encourages obesity at the expense of sound nutritional practices" (Fields 2004).  This is particularly the 
case for subsidized sweeteners from corn (high-fructose corn syrup, or HFCS), hydrogenated fats from 
soybeans, and feed for cattle and pigs; this, "in turn, drives down the prices of fattening fare such as 
prepackaged snacks, ready-to-eat meals, fast food, corn-fed beef and pork, and soft drinks" (op. cit).  
What is more, "corn-fed cattle require more antibiotics and their beef has a higher fat content."  All of this 
is especially troubling, if one considers that roughly half of US expenses on healthcare comes from 
various government programs. Thus, the US government is simultaneously (a) subsidizing foods that 
cause disease, and (b) subsidizing treatment of the same diseases.  
Nestle (2007) provides a superb history of the food pyramid politics, but her lack of a rigorous analytical 
framework leads her to call for more government intervention to fix the problem of regulatory capture; 
likewise, Archer et al. (2017) document the history and problem of federal nutritional guidance, but limit 
themselves to a gentle conclusion: that federal nutritional guidance was based on "biased, implausible 
anecdotal evidence and that rigorous contrary research and the diversity of expert opinions on diet –
health relationships were ignored. Scheall et al (forthcoming) apply a model of politicized science to the 
narrow case of carbohydrates v. fat described in Taubes (2007).  We build upon Scheall et al. to apply a 
theory of scientific distortion and regulatory capture to federal nutritional guidance, more broadly . 
Section 1 outlines the politicization of science and regulatory capture.  Section 2 specifically examines 
federal nutrition advice through this theoretical framework. The final section concludes.  
2 When Science Meets Politics1 
2.1 Distorting the Process of Scientific Discovery 
In this section, we build on the model of science as a complex phenomenon of feedback loops and self -
correction, proposed by Scheall et al. forthcoming (as well as earlier work by Butos and McQuade 2012 
and 2006). Because human knowledge is limited, institutions that create and transmit knowledge are of 
great importance (see Hayek 1960). The market is one such institution, as it gathers the preferences and 
abilities of consumers, and feeds them into the market process, thus aggregating preferences and sharing 
information. The profit and loss mechanism actualizes this information, as entrepreneurs receive 
feedback about the value they are adding (or not) for consumers.  Prices thus have an epistemic function, 
as they guide the actions of consumers and entrepreneurs by giving them relevant information (Horwitz 
2000). Beyond basic microeconomics, price controls and other interventions are distortionary, because 
they break the process of communication and coordination (Mises 1979).  Scientific knowledge emerges in 
a manner similar to economic knowledge (see Kuhn 1962), through the "Publication-Citation-Reputation" 
(PCR) process of discovery and correction (Butos and McQuade 2012; see also Butos and McQuade 2006):   
                                                 
1 This section draws from Mussler and Wenzel (2020). 
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Scientists publish speculations and observations; other scientists who find these useful to their own 
work (or who wish to criticize them) cite them; the citation feeds back to affect the reputation of the 
publishing scientist; and a scientist's reputation not only affects the notice given to his future 
publications and citations but also his ability to attract funding or to advance in academic positions. 
This recursive set of procedures and feedback loops, hereafter referred to as "PCR" (for "Publication-
Citation-Reputation"), implements the knowledge-generating characteristics of the scientific order. 
 
The presence of a big player can distort the discovery process (see Koppl 2002).  Specifically, the big 
player (especially one that grants subsidies) can influence the emphasis on research in some areas, to the 
detriment of others. It can destabilize the feedback and correction mechanism by favoring one particular 
area of inquiry or set of results. And it can generally distort the knowledge creation and correction 
process by putting its proverbial thumb on the scale through funding guidelines and grants – or, in the 
case of government, pushing a certain agenda through regulatory action and congressional oversight . 
Consider, then, the fact that the federal government today funds more than 50% of basic research in the 
US (Butos and McQuade 2006; see also Butos and McQuade 2012).  Many will claim that this simply solves 
a market failure. Their argument is that everybody benefits from science, but nobody has an interest in 
funding basic research, because it's difficult or impossible to capture the rewards – so there won't be 
enough basic research unless the government steps in.  We counter that government funding of science is 
problematic for three significant reasons: first, for the general distortionary effects just discussed; 
second, because this means that research priorities (and perhaps even results) are driven largely by 
politics, rather than science; and third, because this research is simply assumed to be neutral (rather than 
tainted by industry interests).2  
Butos and McQuade (2012) offer a taxonomy to analyze the process by which the scientific process 
responds to funding, and the problems that arise with centralization of.  They differentiate among three 
effects of spending on science: direction, destabilization, and distortion. As we will see, the first two are 
not problematic, regardless of the source of funding – because science is a self-correcting process of 
discovery. The third distortion, however, is problematic because it can break the very PCR process of self-
correction. 
2.1.1 The Direction of Scientific Funding 
Funding affects the direction of science: "directional effects are treated here as outcomes which result 
from changes in the amount and focus of funding but which do not induce any changes in the PCR 
processes and which therefore do not result in the production of invalid science" (Butos and McQuade 
2012). Any funder of science, whether government, industry, or non-profit, will have spending priorities.  
Some areas of science will receive more funding than others (especially if the priorities are set politically, 
rather than scientifically – that is, if the government emerges as a big player in science funding).  But the 
scientific process itself will not be broken (on the unintended consequences of politicized science, see 
Kealy 1996).  
2.1.2 Destabilizing Scientific Inquiry 
Funding affects the stability of scientific inquiry, as priorities shift.  Butos and McQuade (2012) explain 
that "in a funding regime of a small number of large funding sources, the shifting priorities of the funding 
institution may result in a phenomenon of 'boom and bust' within scientific disciplines.  The boom is 
initiated as generous funding policies make funding more generally available and easier to o btain, and as 
'popularity' (for both real and political reasons) of a particular subdiscipline makes funding for that 
subdiscipline easier to get." This means that research will often progress in cycles; in the boom phase, 
"research projects that under earlier funding conditions would not have been attempted are now able to 
be funded." Later, "the bust will come when it becomes apparent that many of the research projects in 
the subdiscipline enjoying the boom cannot be completed, either because, due to a sh ift in funding 
priorities, the funding for the projects is scaled back or terminated before the projects are completed, or 
because reality manifests itself in the form of lack of experimental validation."  Just as with the directional 
effect, the shift in funding priorities for a big player will affect scientific research, but there is no effect on 
the process of scientific inquiry. 
                                                 
2 Of course, a private company could temporarily emerge as a big player, with distortionary effects. However, (a) markets 
are more dynamic than governments; and (b) private entities do not have the image of legitimacy enjoyed by the federal 
government. Given basic transparency, consumers would be wary of nutrition sponsored by agribusiness, in a way they 
wouldn't about research sponsored by agribusiness through the state. 
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Butos and McQuade 2012 give two short examples where government funding influenced the direction 
and stability of scientific research, but did not distort it. In the wake of the 1957 Sputnik launch, the US 
shifted national research priorities to "physics, mathematics, astronautics, and space science research" – 
but "interest and funding fell markedly" after the moon landings.  Likewise, in the 1980s, in response to a 
perceived Japanese threat, the US government doubled funding for computer science (and especially AI), 
only to shift its attention elsewhere when the Japanese project failed and commercial computers 
surpassed government capabilities. 
2.1.3 Distorting Scientific Inquiry 
Finally, "distorting effects are those effects which work to impair or circumvent those evolved institutions 
fundamental to science's functioning as an adaptive classifying system.  When the procedures and  
feedback loops crucial for the long run viability and robustness of science are bypassed or impaired, the 
functioning of the scientific order becomes maladaptive to science's normal environment and the so -
called knowledge generated in these conditions is tainted, if not totally invalid" (Butos and McQuade 
2012).  Note that this distortionary capacity does not include fraud in scientific research; indeed, as long 
as the PCR process is functioning, fraud will be both deterred and corrected.  The real, system ic, problem 
is "the potential for distortion that derives from pressures external to science – in particular those 
inherent in the characteristics of the funders and the degree of decentralization of the funding 
environment.  In an environment composed of many funders, the effectiveness of the any single one to 
interfere with the PCR processes and their operation is likely to be small.  They lack the ability to impose 
their will on a significant segment of the scientific order" (ibid).   
Beyond the theory, government funding has caused the predicted distortions in climate science, while 
compromising the objectivity of research (Butos and McQuade 2015; see also Wojick and Michaels 2015).  
The presence of government as a big player has led to politicization of  science, and quashing of dissent.  
Those who question climate change, or accept it but question its anthropogenic roots, are ridiculed, 
isolated, fired, or poo-pooed as "deniers" (see Michaels and Knappenberger 2016 or Michaels and Balling 
2010).  The point here is not whether climate change exists, or if it's anthropogenic – that is for scientists 
(and the PCR process!) to decide.  The point is that the debate is one-sided, and dissent is not treated 
scientifically, but politically.  One can hardly imagine a physicist being fired or ridiculed for advancing the 
theory that the Higgs boson doesn't exist… or being disparaged as a "Higgs boson denier."  As an 
illustration of the overwhelming weight of government, Oreskes and Conway (2010) point to corporate -
funded attempts to disprove the thesis of anthropogenic climate change. Without the funding weight 
and, or the imprimatur of (claimed) public interest, they were ultimately unsuccessful at quashing dissent 
in the marketplace of ideas – unlike the government, which has successfully done so by shutting down 
that market through its "big player" status.  Similarly, White (2005) finds that 74% of academic articles on 
monetary policy, published in 2002 by US-based economists, appeared in journals published by the US 
Federal Reserve, or were co-authored by a Fed economist."  This leads to a status quo bias, in what 
Milton Friedman had earlier called "a sort of oligopoly on monetary opinion" by the Fed and its affiliates 
(Fettig 1993).  White (2005) concludes that "Fed-sponsored research generally adheres to a high level of 
scholarship, but it does not follow that institutional bias is absent or that the appropriate level of scrutiny 
is zero."   It is not surprising, then, that mainstream economists rarely question the  fundamentals of 
central banking and monetary intervention (Ebelling 1978, Boettke and Smith 2016), and that both 
popular and political opinion ignored the role of the Fed in causing (or exacerbating) the Great Financial 
Crisis of 2007 through loose monetary policy (Horwitz and Boettke 2008; Mussler and Wenzel 2020).   
Taubes (2007, 51-52) describes the presence of government as big player in the carbohydrate versus fate 
debate:   
Scientists were believed to be free of conflicts if their only source of funding was a federal agency, but 
all nutritionists knew if their research failed to support the government position on a particular 
subject, the funding would go instead to someone whose research did. The NIH [National Institutes of 
Health] panels that decide funding represent the orthodoxy and will tend to perceive research 
interpreted in a contrarian manner as unworthy of funding. 
 
Butos and McQuade (2012) conclude that the government presents one more problem, beyond being a 
big player:   
Concentration of the funding environment is not the only characteristic of public funding with 
distortion potential.  Government funding of science comes equipped with political or even 
constitutional prerogatives for overseeing science not available to private funders, and these are 
ordinarily justified as providing the oversight and accountability taxpayers sometimes expect from 
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government. The use of regulatory vehicles (with access to an arsenal of resources – staff, lawyers, 
and raw political muscle), such as Congressional hearings and access to media outlets can, whether 
intentionally or not, exert an influence [on] scientists' scientific reputations for good or ill, and can 
lead to the circumvention of standard evaluative procedures and criteria used to review and ascertain 
the publication worthiness of scientific work.  There is a clear sense, then, in which the simple 
expedient of government funding science may generate incompatibilities with the institutions of 
science. 
2.2 Regulatory Capture 
Stigler (1971) wrote the ground-breaking "theory of economic regulation." He outlines both sides of the 
market for regulation. On the demand side, industries seek privileges from the state.  On the supply side, 
politicians and regulators are pleased to provide the service – at a cost, i.e. campaign contributions and 
votes. Stigler outlines three categories of benefits that the state can provide to industry:  (1) outright 
subsidies; (2) barriers to entry; and (3) price controls.  Stigler outlines the details of the market for 
regulation, showing the extent to which we can expect regulation, depending on particular circumstances 
such as industry income, size, elasticity of supply, geographical concentration, etc.  McChesney (1987) 
complements Stigler's theory, by explaining the phenomena of both rent-creation (for the benefit of 
industry, with a corollary benefit to the regulators who provide it), and rent -extraction (whereby 
politicians can extract resources from industry by threatening regulations).  Similarly, Engstrom (2012) 
defines the process of regulatory capture as "a process by which policy is directed away from the public 
interest and towards the interests of a regulated industry." Interestingly, something so obvious dismissed 
in the theory of market failure and government correction? (See Samuelson 1954; see also Leighton and 
Lopez 2012 for a history). Engrstrom (2012) explains that "virtually any policy can be framed in public 
interest terms." And 50 years ago, Stigler (1971) warned against the "idealistic view of public regulation 
[that] is deeply imbedded in professional and economic thought."   
More recent literature distinguishes between material and non-material regulatory capture (Kwak 2014).  
We have already examined material capture, whereby lobbyists extract financial benefi ts from the 
regulatory apparatus. Non-material capture can take three forms: (1) information capture; (2) cultural 
capture; and (3) discovery capture.  
Information capture is rather straightforward.  Simply, lobbyists take advantage of the administrative law 
requirement that agencies consider all submissions, by inundating regulators with complex information to 
influence regulatory outcomes (see Kwak 2014 or Wagner 2010).  Groups that stand to receive a 
concentrated benefit (producers) are in a position to coordinate vast sums to produce information, 
relative to those who bear the diffuse costs (consumers).  
Cultural capture – also referred to as cognitive or social capture – occurs when a regulatory agency 
interacts with industry more as a partner, rather than as a regulator. Regulators start seeing the world 
through the eyes of the regulated entity, thus using public means to advance private preferences.  Kwak 
(2014) explains that this can happen through group identification, status, or relationship networks, 
especially in a world of "revolving doors." As a simple example, just between 2009 and 2010, 148 former 
employees of financial regulatory agencies registered as lobbyists representing that very industry (Kwak 
2014). Likewise, the same individual person has gone back and forth over the past 30 years between 
posts as a government regulator of food safety, and as an attorney, or lobbyist for Monsanto (a company 
best known for its genetically modified organisms, or GMOs).  or as a lobbyist or attorney for Monsanto. 
From FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy and USDA Administrator of the Food Safety & Inspection 
Service, he became Vice President for Public Policy at Monsanto, then FDA Deputy Commissioner for 
Foods. The point here is not whether GMOs are healthy (a question we economists leave to scientists) – 
but that public "virtue" and private "vice" are highly unlikely to be well -delineated in revolving door 
environments (see Lewis 2013, especially chapters 8-11). 
Discovery capture – the capture of the deeper processes of knowledge discovery – is more complex than 
informational and cultural capture. It is essentially the broader expansion of the distortion of the 
scientific discovery process described above.  
2.3 Political Science and Regulatory Capture 
Public Choice theory teaches us that there are fundamental interests being pursued when anything is 
politically driven. Science is valued for its commitment to objectivity and rigorous processeses of 
discovery and falsifiability – but government-funded science will inevitably be politically biased. In short, 
while government-funded research is justified as a value-neutral countervailing force to corporate-
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funded research, this is very unlikely to be true. It is naïve simply to assume that government-funded 
science is any more neutral or less neutral than any other funded science. All science is funded somehow, 
but once dispersion and diversity in sources of funding disappear, the "big player" problem overtakes 
nearly all other considerations. More important, then, is the likelihood that government-funded science 
will not serve the public interest but will serve the interests of the politicians or the lobbyists who 
sponsor it. Consider two examples. First, the science has yet to be fully settled on GMOs.3 Yet, "the FDA 
tries to remain as silent as possible about GMOs [and] the US Department of Agriculture and other parts 
of the US government are doing everything they can to promote them" (Lewis 2013, 118). In addition, 
GMO companies were able to slip a rider into the 2013 House Agricultural Appropriations bill, "stripping 
federal courts of the authority to halt the sale or sowing of GMO crops while USDA undertakes an 
environmental assessment" (ibid, 120). Second, Williams (2012) explains that "the biggest problem… is 
the misconception that the federal government is the sole source of assurance of safe food….  New 
regulations pile on top of old ones. The government has no ability to enforce them, yet regulations give 
consumers the illusion of control." This sentiment is echoed by a former member of the US Food and 
Nutrition Board, who explained that "The US government is as big of a pusher as industry.  If you say what 
the government says, then it's okay. If you say something that isn't what the government says, or that be 
parallel to what industry says, that makes you suspect" (in Butos and McQuade 2012).   
Again, the fundamental problem boils down to the widespread assumption of governmental neutrality. 
Coca-Cola has funded research downplaying the link between sugar and obesity.4 An automobile 
manufacturer might fund research on the impact of tariffs on foreign cars for the US economy as a whole. 
In such cases, the results will be considered with healthy skepticism. But if the federal government funds 
or publishes research, readers will naively assume that the research is unbiased, untainted by influence, 
and a reflection of the public interest. 
3 Capturing Science: The Case of Federal Nutrition Advice 
We now apply the framework of political capture of science to the case of federal nutrition advice. 
3.1 Some Background: Food Politics5 
The agricultural sector is not the biggest lobbyist (that place is held by the financial industry), but it is one 
of the top 10, as measured by political donations.6 As of 2015, agribusiness contributed about $133 
million to the political process, within the overall $3.22 billion in lobbying for that year. 7 The US 
Department of Agriculture – the primary government player in food politics – faces a dual mandate of 
protecting agricultural producers and protecting the interests of consumers. There is clearly tension 
between the two; the US Department of Agriculture tends to favor those who make the most political 
donations or stand to offer the best employment terms to former elected officials and bureaucrats who 
will use the revolving door. In the end, these agents, under the guise of public service, have a strong 
incentive to favor industry interests over consumer interests.  
Here are some of the actions taken by those in public service that favor agribusiness:  
• $13.7 billion in 2014 agricultural subsidies, including $42.5 million for conservation, $29 million for 
disaster assistance, $183 million for commodity subsidies, and $67.6 million in crop insurance8 
• Over the past decade, almost $250 billion on farm income stabilization and agricultural research and 
services9. 
• $3 million (2007-2011) "to 2,300 farms where no crop of any sort was grown"10 
                                                 
3 As economists, we cannot assess the scientific status of GMOs. We can, however, comment on the process of scientific 
discovery. 
4 "How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat," by A. O'Connor, The New York Times, September 12, 2016, 
http://nyti.ms/2cynHOS. See also O'Keefe et al. 2016 and, generally, Taubes 
5 I borrow this section title from Nestle's (2007) overview.  
6 www.opensecrets.org/overview/sectors.php 
7 http://opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php&id-A7year=2015. http://opensecrets.org/lobby/. For a general history, and a 
good overview of food politics, see Nestle (2007, especially chapter 4) 
8 https://farm.ewg.org/regionsummary.php?fips=00000&regionname=theUnitedStates 
9 https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/383/item/492445. Office of Management and Budget, 2016 Historical Tables Table 3.2 – 
Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940-2020 Line 350 – Agriculture. 
10 http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21643191-crop-prices-fall-farmers-grow-subsidies-instead-milking-
taxpayers 
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• Mandatory consumer-financed marketing, to the tune of roughly $1.2 billion/year.11 (Compare this to 
the annual advertising budget of the food industry of $136 million.)12 
• Significant influence (and occasional veto power) over federal dietary guidelines 
• Critics point to cronyism in the marking of food safety regulations from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). Williams (2012) explains that "instead of developing and complementing 
systems that hold firms accountable for problems ex post (i.e., after the fact), government remains 
fixated with a more ex ante (i.e., before an event) approach: "command and control." These systems 
are 'comfortable' for incumbent industries that routinely lobby for more regulation and larger 
budgets for the agencies."  
• The most recent update of food safety regulations, the Food Safety Management Act of 2011, places a 
disproportionate burden on small farmers. According to FDA estimates, compliance costs will be 6% 
of average annual gross sales for very small farms, 4% for small farms, and only 1% of average annual 
gross sales for large farms.13 This is not surprising, if we consider that funding for the FDA comes from 
the agricultural subcommittees of both the House and Senate appropriations committees. 
3.2 Putting It All Together: The Food Pyramid 
Information and discovery regulatory capture are obvious in the case of US dietary guidelines (for a full 
history, see Archer et al. 2018). Nestle (2007, 30) states it bluntly: "dietary guidelines necessarily are 
political compromises between what science tells us about nutrition and health versus what is good for 
the food industry."14 From the initial 1968 congressional hearings on the subject, federal dietary 
guidelines have involved regulatory capture (Nestle 2007, 38-50 and chapter 2). Early on, agribusiness 
was opposed to the emerging scientific consensus about decreasing overall caloric intake, as well as 
caloric intake from animal fats specifically. The USDA's first "food pyramid" of dietary guidelines, in 1991, 
was surrounded by industry disapproval. Within two weeks of its release in April 1991, the first food 
pyramid was retracted by USDA, because of agribusiness disapproval. Leading the charge, the meat and 
dairy lobbies objected to what they perceived as a governmental campaign to encourage consumers to 
eat less of their products (Nestle 2007, 53-61). In 1992, "a year and a day and $855,000 after the 
announcement of [the 1991 pyramid's] withdrawal" (ibid, 63), the USDA released its revised food 
pyramid. Nestle explains what could be perceived as a tempest in a teacup (ibid, 63-64): 
The new version differed from the [original] in at least 33 ways, most of them utterly trivial. Two, 
however, were not. The term "Eating Right" had been changed to "Food Guide" in response to 
complaints from Kraft Foods (owned by Philip Morris) that the title infringed on its copyrighted 
line of prepared meals, and to complaints from ConAgra that the Pyramid might give Kraft a 
marketing advantage. The most important change was also designed to appease food producers. 
The numbers of recommended servings had been moved outside the design and set in boldface 
type to suggest that the diet should include at least 2-3 servings of meat and dairy foods each 
day. This change implied an increase in servings from the [1958] Basic Four [guidelines]. 
Ironically, given who had registered the most complaints, the Pyramid had increased the upper 
range of the meat allowance. It specified that the two servings should be "the equivalent of 5 to 7 
ounces of cooked lean meat" rather than the 4-6 ounces suggested in the Basic Four guide."  
The 1992 food pyramid was revised in 2005 to feature vertical wedges – Nestle (2007, 62) suggests this 
came about because meat and dairy producers prefer a vertical shape that suggests greater equivalence 
among food groups. In 2011, the food pyramid was replaced by a food plate, featuring four roughly 
equivalent quadrants, with fruit and vegetables composing half the space, and grains and protein the 
other half; dairy is in a separate circle (presumably a glass).   
The current food guidelines are problematic for several reasons:  
• They do not reflect the central piece of dietary advice in an advanced industrial country, viz. "eat less" 
overall – which is ferociously opposed by agribusiness (Nestle 2007, 77) 
• The guidelines do not differentiate between complex and simple carbohydrates, or between whole 
grains and refined grains15 
                                                 
11 This includes all marketing activities by the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, 
http://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/fy16budsum.pdf 
12 For 2015; https://www.statista.com/topics/2223/food-advertising/ 
13 http://sustainableagriculture.net/fsma/learn-about-the-issues/costs-to-farmers-and-consumers-produce-rule/ 
14 See also Scrinis 2013; on food labeling politics, see Frohlich 2016. On "scientific advice as performance," i.e. the 
presentation of scientific information on the public stage, see Hilgartner 2000. 
15 See, e.g., www.nutritionmd.org 
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• The food plate says nothing of fats, and the food pyramid (which does recommend fats be consumed 
sparingly) does not mention that most fat intake comes from dairy and meat (which have their own 
categories) 
• The food guidelines do not differentiate among saturated fats, unsaturated fats, and trans fats – there 
is still scientific debate on this, but there are recent concerns among nutrition scientists that trans fats 
(rather than the previous benchmark, saturated fats) are the greatest contributors to heart disease16 
Beyond the practical health concerns, the food guidelines are also problematic for epistemic reasons  
(leave it to economist to worry about theory over health!). Science, properly carried out, is a complex 
emergent phenomenon of feedback loops and self-correction. As explained above, when a big player is 
present – especially one with the size and moral imprimatur of government – it will likely distort the 
process of scientific discovery. Since the congressional hearings of 1968, the government has "turned a 
scientific question into a political one" (Butos and McQuade 2012): what is healthy, and what isn't? 
Despite disagreements among nutritionists – specifically over the fat v. carbohydrate fight – what has 
emerged is a "quasi-official government stance and popularly accepted belief that [has] legitimated the 
basic contention of a controversial scientific and clinical take on dietary issues. " In the 1980s, the 
National Institutes of Health "simply announced that such a consensus did exist": fat is the main culprit 
for fundamental chronic illnesses associated with poor nutritional choices (Butos and McQuade 2012).  
Although the dietary guidelines have received the government's imprimatur, controversy continues. 
Taubes (2007) explains how carbohydrates may indeed be more problematic than fat.17  
The problem here is not that the government provides one of many competing pyramids  – after all, 
competition, is healthy, and disagreement is a part of the scientific process. The problem is that 
government's imprimatur makes it seem to consumers that its word is final. Three competing pyramids18 
– from respected scientific sources – offer information that conflicts with official government advice: 
• The University of Michigan proposes a complex pyramid of 11 categories, with abundant fruits, 
vegetables, grains and legumes, and limited "healthy fats," dairy, eggs, fish and seafood, and "lean 
meats." 
• The Harvard School of Public Health proposes a "Healthy Eating Plate" that is composed half of fruits 
and vegetables (like the federal plate), and half of "whole grains" and "healthy proteins," with limited 
dairy. 
• The Center for Science in the Public Interest suggests 11 daily servings of vegetable and fruit (to the 
USDA's 5-9), only 4 servings of grain (versus 6-11), 2 servings of dairy (versus 2-3) and only one of 
meat (versus 2-3), with a higher fat and sugar intake (2 each daily versus the USDA pyramid's 
"sparingly" advice). 
Despite the existence of competing food guidelines, the government's advice prevails – back to the 
"misconception that the federal government is the sole source of assurance" (Williams 2012). 
As noted earlier, our expertise (as economists) is not nutrition – and this is not a scientific paper on 
nutrition. However, economics provides significant insights into the process of knowledge generation. In 
this case, we identify a structural conflict between federal advice and other credible sources of nutrition 
advice. In the marketplace of ideas (and in the scientific process), conflicting ideas are commonplace and 
healthy. But federal guidelines have the imprimatur of the state and create ossification and distortion of 
the scientific discovery processes themselves. Returning to Nestle's (2007, 30) lament that "dietary 
guidelines necessarily are political compromises between what science tells us about nutrition and health 
versus what is good for the food industry," we have to ask why science should be a political compromise 
in the first place.  
                                                 
16 "The FDA's Phony Nutrition Science: How Big Food and Agriculture Trumps Real Science – and Why the Government 




18 We could broaden this study by examining the internationalization of food pyramids; see Scheall et al. (forthcoming). 
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4 Conclusion 
As we have seen, the government has failed to provide unbiased, scientific nutritional information, and it 
is simultaneously thwarting the process of scientific discovery.  
Fortunately, information can effectively and efficiently be provided by private sources, without the 
dangers associated with the big player of government, and the imprimatur placed on one set of 
information, which is decidedly not neutral. This has been the case in fields where the market is allowed 
to function, so we can anticipate the same would hold for nutrition. Hayek (194 8, 97), describes the 
alternative, market solution: 
In actual life the fact that our inadequate knowledge of the available commodities or services 
is made up for by our experience with the persons or firms supplying them – that 
competition is in a large measure competition for reputation or good will – is one of the most 
important facts which enables us to solve our daily problems. The function of competition is 
here precisely to teach us who will serve us well: which grocer or travel agency, which 
department store or hotel, which doctor or solicitor, we can expect to provide the most 
satisfactory solution for whatever particular personal problem we may have to face. 
Klein (2002) likewise admonishes us that "intellectuals, commentators, and regulators working on quality 
and safety regulation should seriously consider how resourceful middlemen, expert knowers, trustworthy 
promisers, and wary trusters find ways to overcome virtually any of the supposed failures of the free 
enterprise system. The demand for assurance brings forth a supply of assurance."  
Indeed, we routinely see markets generating information on consumer goods:  Underwriters Laboratory or 
Consumer Reports for product safety; Green Seal or Eco-Rating International for environmental 
friendliness; religious authorities for Halal and Kosher food; the Internet Highway Parental Empowerment 
Group, the Platform for Internet Content Selection, SafeSurf or the Recreational Software Advisory 
Council for protecting children on the internet; a bevy of investment advisors and financial analysis 
agencies;19 the network of Better Business Bureaus and Consumers Union for consumer protection;  or the 
myriad informal internet-based rating systems, from Uber driver ratings to Yelp or Urban Spoon, and the 
ubiquitous online review. For details and analysis, see Yilmaz (1998).  
In addition to such private regulatory agencies, we also see a strong history of non-regulatory legal 
mechanisms to protect consumers (that is, until the rise of the regulatory state in the US, and a shift from 
common law to administrative law and rule by regulation). As an example, see Meiners and Yandle (1998) 
for a case study on the use of non-regulatory means (property rights and tort law) to prevent 
environmental damage without problems of regulatory capture or rent-seeking. Returning to nutrition, 
Williams (2012) explains the emergence of private solutions for food safety inspections, where 
government could not keep up with the evolving knowledge: 
Because of this growth in complexity in food manufacturing, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in particular finds it increasingly difficult to have the necessary 
knowledge to meaningfully regulate food processing and packaging. Private inspections take 
place on a more frequent basis than even a combination of federal and state regulators could 
achieve with a realistic amount of public resources. In addition, thousands of new private 
[food safety] firms are now providing food manufacturers with both expert advice and third-
party inspections. This new system will not eliminate all foodborne disease — pathogens are 
ubiquitous; new foods, equipment, and technologies are evolving — but constant and 
continuous monitoring can reduce illness. 
The same could apply to nutrition advice, if the distortionary big player is removed, and ceases its 
distortion of the scientific process. The negative consequences of cronyism are numerous, and cronyism 
nakedly advances the interests of concentrated benefits with diffuse costs. We would do well by not 
doing "good" and by exploring alternatives to a system that is clearly infused with cronyism and the 
mutual patronage which accompanies it. Our health – and a non-insignificant portion of US GDP, given 
public involvement in the provision of health care – depend on it. 
                                                 
19 Before their advice was corrupted by cronyism (see White 2010). 
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